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Security Council

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Letter dated 30 June 2008 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

Following the necessary consultations, I am pleased to inform you that I, jointly with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, have appointed Mr. Djibrill Yipènè Bassolé of Burkina Faso as the Joint African Union — United Nations Chief Mediator for Darfur. Mr. Bassolé will conduct the mediation efforts in the Sudan on a full-time basis. Mr. Jan Eliasson and Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim will remain available for advice and engagement as required.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ban** Ki-moon

08-41365 (E) 090708

United Nations S/2008/439

Security Council

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Letter dated 3 July 2008 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 30 June 2008 (S/2008/438) concerning the appointment of Mr. Djibrill Yipènè Bassolé of Burkina Faso as the Joint African Union — United Nations Chief Mediator for Darfur has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the appointment indicated in your letter.

(*Signed*) **Le** Luong Minh
President of the Security Council

08-41371 (E) 090708

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Security Council

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Letter dated 3 July 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the States members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, I am writing to draw the Council's attention and to convey our utmost concern over the grave situation prevailing in the Occupied Palestinian Territory including East Jerusalem. The already deteriorated situation is being further aggravated by Israel's illegal actions and plans to continue with the expansion of settlements in direct contravention of international law and its commitments under the road map.

Israel has failed to abide by its commitment to freeze all settlement activity including "natural growth" and to dismantle settlement outposts erected since March 2001. On the contrary, in blatant defiance of calls from the international community, Israel continues unabated its settlement activity throughout the West Bank, particularly in and around East Jerusalem. It is a matter of great concern that since the Annapolis Conference, Israel has issued tenders for approximately 17,000 new housing units in illegal Israeli settlements across the occupied West Bank, including in occupied East Jerusalem. Israel also recently announced to issue over 880 new tenders in two illegal settlements, including that constructed on Jabal Abu Ghneim in occupied East Jerusalem.

Israel's policy of encouraging, financing, establishing and expanding settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory violates two main principles of international humanitarian law: the prohibition on the transfer of civilians from an occupying Power's territory to the occupied territory, and the prohibition of creating permanent changes in the occupied territory that are not for the benefit of the occupied population. In particular, article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention states: "the Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies".

The seizure and appropriations of land for Israeli settlements, bypass roads and related infrastructure and discriminatory access to other vital resources, including water, have had a devastating impact on the fundamental rights of the local Palestinian population, including their rights to an adequate standard of living, housing, health, education and work, and freedom of movement within the occupied territories.

The international community has long recognized the unlawfulness of the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. Security Council resolution 465

(1980) called upon Israel "to dismantle the existing settlements and in particular to cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem".

The eleventh Summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, held in Dakar on 13 and 14 March 2008, reaffirmed the central character of the cause of Al-Quds Al-Sharif for the whole Muslim Ummah. The Conference reiterated its strong condemnation of Israel, the occupying Power, for its persistent aggression against Islamic holy places in and around Al-Quds Al-Sharif. The Conference also denounced Israel for its illegal excavations beneath Al-Haram Al-Sharif and Al-Aqsa Mosque, and for all such illegal and provocative measures carried out by it with the intention of altering the Holy City's legal status and demographic composition and character.

The expansionist designs of Israel are intended to destroy the territorial contiguity, integrity and unity of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and are aimed at changing the demographic composition of the region. The illegal settlement expansion and the continuing construction of the separation wall, whose unlawful and illegal character has been confirmed by the 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, reveal the true Israeli intentions of eventually annexing the territories in question.

At this critical juncture, Israel's unabashed violations of international humanitarian law and non-fulfilment of its commitments under the road map and the Annapolis Conference could jeopardize the current peace process and further destabilize the already fragile situation.

The member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference strongly urge the Security Council in fulfilment of its Charter responsibilities, to take immediate steps necessary to address this critical situation, particularly by compelling Israel to respect its obligations under international law, international humanitarian law, relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the provisions of the road map, particularly with regard to the settlement activity.

The Security Council must also play its due role for achieving a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement of the question of Palestine in accordance with international legitimacy and its own resolutions.

The Organization of the Islamic Conference reaffirms its support for the establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine on the basis of the pre-1967 borders with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital.

I shall be grateful if you could circulate this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Munir **Akram**
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2008/441

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8 July 2008

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Letter dated 7 July 2008 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to resolution 1822 (2008), adopted by the Security Council on 30 June 2008, concerning the Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions regime. In paragraph 39 of that resolution, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the current New York-based Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team for a further period of 18 months. The Council also requested me to make the necessary arrangements to that effect.

Accordingly, I wish to inform you that I have reappointed the following six experts for a period ending 31 December 2009. Efforts are being made to identify replacements for the two remaining experts, who resigned from their functions as from 22 and 30 June 2008, respectively. Once those candidates have been identified, I will take the appropriate action.

Mr. Richard Barrett (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
Mr. Wilson Kalumba (Zambia)
Mr. Franck Kasbarian (France)
Ms. Christine Lee (Singapore)
Mr. Mubarak Mashhoor al-Shahrani (Saudi Arabia)
Mr. Victor Shtoyunda (Russian Federation)

I have selected Mr. Barrett to continue to serve as the Coordinator of the Monitoring Team.

I should be grateful if you could bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ban** Ki-moon

08-41432 (E) 080708

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Letter dated 7 July 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Viet Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to forward to you herewith a concept paper for the Security Council open debate on "Children and armed conflict", which is to be held on 17 July 2008 (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and the attached concept paper could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Le Luong **Minh**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam

08-41334 (E) 080708

Annex to the letter dated 7 July 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Viet Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept paper for the Security Council open debate on "Children and armed conflict": 17 July 2008

Recognizing the need to further strengthen the commitment of the Security Council and the United Nations at large to the issue of children affected by armed conflict, the Vietnamese Presidency of the Security Council will hold an open debate focused on the issue of children and armed conflict, especially the ways and means by which the international community as a whole can contribute to achieving long-term and sustained solutions to the issue.

The situation of children affected by armed conflict has been a focus of the Security Council since the adoption of Council resolution 1261 (1999), its first resolution on children and armed conflict. Since that time, the Council has demonstrated its resolve on this issue through the adoption of five other thematic resolutions, namely resolutions 1314 (2000), 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003), 1539 (2004) and 1612 (2005).

The engagement of the Security Council has translated into some tangible results. Four formal action plans to identify and release children from fighting forces and to prevent further recruitment have been agreed to by parties to conflict listed in the annexes of the Secretary-General's annual report. In one situation alone, such action plans have already translated into the release of some 1,400 children associated with armed groups, which have now been de-listed from the annexes to the said annual report. Elsewhere, formal and informal agreements with parties to conflict are in place and are expected to turn into formal action plans in the coming months. In addition, specific provisions relating to children have been more systematically included in peace processes and agreements, providing, among other things, for the reintegration of children into their communities. United Nations peacekeeping mandates are also more systematically incorporating child protection provisions through the inclusion of child protection adviser posts in nine peacekeeping and political missions.

The Working Group of the Security Council on Children and Armed Conflict conducts regular reviews of country reports of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict and makes relevant recommendations to the Council. The Working Group has reviewed 18 such reports to date and has issued 13 sets of conclusions and recommendations on this basis.

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for children and armed conflict, in her capacity as an independent moral voice for children, has undertaken 12 country visits over the last 18 months. These missions have facilitated better coordination among United Nations partners, the promotion of regional and international cooperation, collaboration with Governments and dialogue with parties to conflict to elicit concrete child protection commitments.

Against the backdrop of deeper Security Council and system-wide engagement and some elements of progress, the overall situation for children in situations of armed conflict continues to be a serious concern. The seventh annual report of the

Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (A/62/609-S/2007/757) reviews developments in situations of concern and offers a series of recommendations to the Council.

At the last open debate on children and armed conflict on 12 February 2008, the Security Council discussed the above report and adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2008/6) which outlined a number of important considerations in moving the agenda forward. The Council also requested that the next report of the Secretary-General be submitted by May 2009.

It is noteworthy that, while largely focused on a peace and security perspective and a rights-based approach, in the views of many Member States, the United Nations should more adequately address the development approach to the issue of children and armed conflict.

In its last presidential statement, the Security Council stressed the need to adopt a broad strategy of conflict prevention, which addresses the root causes of armed conflict in a comprehensive manner in order to enhance the protection of children on a long-term basis, including by promoting sustainable development, poverty eradication, national reconciliation, good governance, democracy, the rule of law and respect for and protection of human rights. It further recognized that a stronger focus is required on the reintegration and rehabilitation of children associated with armed forces and armed groups, and in this regard invited all parties concerned to enhance their exchange of information about programmes and best practices and to ensure that adequate resources and funding are available to support national strategies or action plans in the area of child protection and welfare, including community-based programmes, with a view to ensuring the long-term sustainability and success of their programmatic response to the release, rehabilitation and reintegration of all children associated with armed forces and armed groups.

Such a development approach can contribute to a long-term and sustained solution to the issue of children and armed conflict.

Member States and other stakeholders are invited to express their views on how the Security Council, the United Nations as a whole and the international community at large can better deliver on the issue of children and armed conflict, including through strengthened focus on, inter alia, the development approach and other aspects contained in the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General (A/62/609-S/2007/757) and the presidential statement of 12 February 2008 (S/PRST/2008/6). In addition, Member States may also wish to refer to the annual report on the activities of the Working Group of the Security Council on Children and Armed Conflict, which is scheduled to be issued in early July.

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Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

I. Introduction

1. The present report, which covers the period from April to June 2008, is submitted pursuant to paragraph 21 of Security Council resolution 1769 (2007), by which the Council requested me to report every 90 days on progress made in the implementation of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the status of the political process.

2. Given that this will be the final report before the Security Council considers the renewal of the UNAMID mandate, I have included a number of observations regarding the last 12 months of the Operation's work, as well as some recommendations for the way forward.

II. Ceasefire and the situation on the ground in Darfur

A. Security situation

3. The last three months have been a turbulent period in Darfur, especially following the 10 May attack by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on Omdurman, which led to increased military activity throughout Darfur and resulted in the suspension of diplomatic relations between Chad and the Sudan. The attack, which lasted from 10 to 12 May, reportedly involved some 1,000 JEM fighters and resulted in dozens of casualties and hundreds of arrests.

4. At the end of April and in early May, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) undertook a bombing campaign in Northern Darfur. On 1 May, UNAMID received reports that an SAF Antonov aircraft bombed Umm Sidr village (100 km north of El Fasher), killing two persons and wounding eight. On 4 May, a market in Shegeg Karo, 70 km north of Umm Baru, was bombed, resulting in several civilian casualties. The air strikes in Northern Darfur and in the northern corridor of Western Darfur during the first week of May killed a total of 19 civilians, including children, women and elderly persons.

5. A dramatic increase in carjackings, in particular along the main supply routes through Southern Darfur, also contributed significantly to insecurity and impeded the delivery of humanitarian aid into the region. During the month of April,

18 United Nations/non-governmental organization vehicles were carjacked; that figure rose to 31 vehicles during the month of May.

Chad-Sudan border

6. Tensions remained high along the Chad-Sudan border, in particular in the period following the attack on Omdurman and the subsequent deterioration of relations between the two countries. During the reporting period, a substantial build-up of SAF and Chadian Armed Opposition Groups (CAOG) elements was observed along the border. On 13 June, CAOG forces seized the towns of Goz Beida and Adé in Chad, only to be driven out of the towns by Chadian regular forces on the following day. Owing to the unstable security situation in the area, non-governmental organizations south of El Geneina were temporarily relocated. A recent summary of the Friends of the Dakar Agreement has included proposals to strengthen the Chad-Sudan border controls. It is too early to comment on whether or when they will be implemented.

B. Activities of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

7. During the reporting period, UNAMID worked consistently to increase its presence throughout the region, develop its capacity to monitor and verify reported incidents and move equipment, supplies and personnel into the mission area. UNAMID was confronted with a number of obstacles in this regard, owing principally to the challenges created by continuing insecurity in the area of operations. In particular, the lack of security along the main supply routes into Darfur has been an issue to which UNAMID has had to devote significant attention. The 29 April hijacking of two UNAMID containers holding contingent-owned equipment for the Chinese Engineer Company in Nyala underscored the security challenges involved in transporting goods overland to Darfur. Following the hijacking, UNAMID immediately commenced a search for the containers and has made every effort to follow all possible leads, without success. The Operation also established a board of inquiry to review the incident. Its findings will be used to inform ongoing efforts so as to improve security of UNAMID convoys. In the meantime, in response to the incident, and taking note of the frequent hijacking of World Food Programme (WFP) and other vehicles along the main supply routes, UNAMID has taken a number of steps towards providing consistent protection for all UNAMID convoys.

8. To assess the security of the different supply routes and to test these protection measures, a UNAMID police convoy consisting of 24 vehicles travelled from El Obeid in Southern Kordofan to Nyala on 14 June and safely transported vehicles and equipment into the mission area. The route was in extremely poor condition, causing frequent delays during the five-day journey, and will soon become worse with the onset of the rainy season. The trial run constitutes the first of many planned protected convoys designed to bring critical equipment, supplies and fuel into Darfur in order to allow for deployment of troops as quickly as possible.

9. In response to the ongoing instability in Western Darfur, where reports of a build-up of CAOG and SAF continued throughout the reporting period, UNAMID has developed a plan to conduct at least three long- and short-range patrols, together

with two night patrols from every company location to internally displaced persons camps throughout the sector each week.

10. In addition to enhancing force presence in volatile areas, the increased number of patrols of roads and villages will improve information gathering and situational awareness. This will result in improved targeting of patrol activities and further improve area security. However, in the most insecure areas, the limited infantry capabilities remain largely absorbed by force protection tasks and escorts. Using the infantry companies to protect the local population, main supply routes and humanitarian space will continue to pose competing priorities. Owing to the deteriorating situation, substantial improvement of area security can only be expected once the additional infantry battalions are deployed and all existing battalions are manned and equipped to United Nations standards.

11. UNAMID continues to increase its police patrol presence throughout Darfur. As indicated in my first quarterly report, UNAMID police initiated a three-phase plan for patrolling camps for internally displaced persons, the third phase of which provides a 24-hour presence in the camps. Patrols are currently undertaken daily from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. in nearly all locations and the Police Commissioner continues to work towards the second phase of patrolling, which will take place from 8 a.m. to midnight. Progress in this regard is being hampered by the lack of reliable communications equipment (personal radios) and the limited presence of formed police units, which are required to provide the necessary protection.

12. UNAMID police took forward several key tasks during the period under review, especially in the areas of confidence-building and monitoring throughout Darfur, as well as training and capacity-building for Government police in order to ensure that policing meets internationally accepted human rights standards. Priority is being given to training the local police in due process and in methods for investigating gender-based violence, with particular emphasis on promoting the human rights of women and children. A major current initiative involves the development of "train the trainer" programmes designed to make the local police force self-sufficient in conducting its own training courses. In addition, criminal investigation units have been established at UNAMID headquarters to monitor reported criminal activity.

13. The Rule of Law Office in UNAMID has initiated its operations in Darfur and will be increasing its capabilities in the coming months. As part of its initial efforts, the Office is conducting outreach with a number of local stakeholders, including the judiciary, the police and the Ministry of Justice. A referral framework is being developed by the Rule of Law Unit in order to ensure that urgent and immediate needs of the local community can be referred to partner offices and agencies as the Office establishes its presence in Darfur.

14. During the reporting period, the UNAMID Humanitarian, Recovery and Development Liaison Section extended its field coverage to all three sectors, commenced work in HIV/AIDS and child protection, and liaised with other substantive sections, such as Human Rights, Political Affairs and Civil Affairs.

III. Humanitarian situation

15. Since the start of the year, approximately 190,000 persons have been displaced in Darfur and ongoing violence throughout Darfur continued to force the displacement of civilians during the reporting period. Clashes between the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) forces and the Sudan Liberation Army-Free Will forces (SLA-FW) in Northern and Southern Darfur resulted in the displacement of more than 90,000 civilians during the reporting period. Shootings and the burning of the market and dwellings of internally displaced persons in Tawila by Government troops on 13 May, in retaliation for the killing of a soldier, temporarily displaced some 20,000 persons.

16. Since the start of the year, eight humanitarian aid workers have been killed, 125 humanitarian vehicles have been hijacked, 117 humanitarian personnel have been temporarily abducted and 36 WFP-contracted drivers are still missing.

17. Negotiations continue between WFP and the Government to provide escorts into Darfur every 48 hours, as agreed at the Sudan Consortium, held from 5 to 7 May 2008. At the same time, humanitarian actors are working with UNAMID to take forward protected humanitarian convoys, though UNAMID faces similar threats to its supply pipeline.

18. Owing to the violence targeting the humanitarian community, in particular WFP-contracted convoys, food aid was halved starting on 1 May 2008. In addition, a very poor crop harvest in Southern and Northern Darfur has led to an expanded "hunger season", when the supply of cereals and other food items has been dramatically reduced. Many implementing partners are reporting evidence of worsening malnutrition and increasing caseloads in therapeutic feeding programmes.

19. The ability of the 16,500 aid workers in Darfur to provide essential humanitarian assistance is being hindered by additional bureaucratic restrictions. For example, in Western Darfur, local government authorities refused to allow non-governmental organizations to transport medical supplies in rented vehicles, despite the clear need to use such vehicles to effectively respond to the size and scope of relief needs. In Nyala, Southern Darfur, local authorities hindered the delivery of fuel required to power water pumps for the populations of the Kalma and Beliel camps. In Zalingei, Western Darfur, the limitation by Government officials of water pump and generator usage for essential services such as health clinics and hospitals further weakened relief operations. In Northern and Southern Darfur, National Security personnel routinely refused helicopter access to rural communities. In addition, two national staff working with United Nations agencies and international non-governmental organizations were detained, in direct violation of the joint communiqué on the facilitation of humanitarian assistance in Darfur. One of the staff members was immediately released, while one continues to be held in detention. In spite of concerted efforts to address issues through the High-level Committee to monitor the implementation of the joint communiqué at the national level, practical implementation in the field remained challenging.

20. Coordination mechanisms between the United Nations country team and UNAMID are being established through Inter-Agency Standing Committee meetings at the State level. In addition, the joint Darfur security management team has enhanced communication on security issues pertaining to humanitarian operations

and regular visits to Darfur by the country team strengthened coordination with UNAMID senior management. The coordination will be further enhanced by the arrival of the incoming Deputy Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, who will be based in El Fasher to ensure effective strategic collaboration between UNAMID and the humanitarian community.

IV. Human rights situation

21. Human rights and humanitarian law continue to be violated by State and non-State actors. Across Darfur, civilians continue to bear the brunt of increased violence and growing insecurity as a result of recurrent fighting by the warring parties and military action by the Government. The killing and suffering of civilians during attacks on villages underscore the failure of all warring factions to distinguish between civilians and military targets, in violation of existing ceasefire arrangements and international law.

22. Incidents of indiscriminate targeting of civilian communities by Government forces continued in Northern Darfur. The most significant of these incidents occurred on 12 May, when members of the Sudanese Central Reserve Police attacked the internally displaced persons camp in Tawila. The policemen surrounded the camp, opened fire indiscriminately, looted and burned huts and destroyed the market. An estimated 20,000 persons living in the camps were displaced to neighbouring villages. A large number of them took refuge in the UNAMID camp in Tawila for several days.

23. Hostilities between rebel factions also continued to cause civilian casualties and mass displacement of communities. In Northern Darfur, repeated clashes between SLA-MM and SLA-FW took a deadly toll on the residents of a number of villages near Kafod. On 21 May, SLA-MM fighters attacked and destroyed three villages believed to be strongholds of SLA-FW, killing 12 civilians. Most of the victims were reportedly burned alive in their huts.

24. Conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence remains widespread in Darfur. Women and girls, in particular among internally displaced persons, continue to be subjected to rape, gang rape, beatings and other forms of violence by State actors, signatory and non-signatory rebel factions and other armed groups. Measures taken by the Government to address the pervasive and persistent incidents of sexual violence in Darfur and the culture of impunity in which they occur have yet to yield significant positive results.

25. Following the recent attack on Omdurman by JEM, Government security agencies in Darfur arrested and detained a number of individuals, apparently on suspicion of involvement in the attack. There is concern that some of the arrests may have been based on perceived individuals' ethnic origins rather than a demonstrated involvement in the attack. Some of the detainees were reportedly subjected to ill-treatment. UNAMID has confirmed that Government agencies in El Geneina arrested at least 13 persons since 10 May, the majority of whom are from the Zaghawa tribe. Some of the detainees were held incommunicado without charge or access to lawyers and family members and without being presented before a judicial authority.

26. On a positive note, the reporting period has witnessed increased cooperation between the Government and UNAMID towards the implementation of recommendations made by a group of United Nations human rights experts on Darfur. The Government agency responsible for human rights and humanitarian issues held several meetings with UNAMID with a view to promoting and prioritizing the implementation of the said recommendations. The reporting period also witnessed the resumption in the activities of some of the institutional frameworks established to combat gender-based violence.

V. Deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

27. As of 18 June, the total strength of UNAMID was 11,359 personnel. That figure included 9,479 uniformed personnel, comprising approximately 7,818 military personnel, 1,661 police officers, 1 formed police unit and 1,880 civilians.

28. The deployment of troops in Darfur has been substantially delayed by the continued insecurity, the slow pace of readying deployment sites to receive the police and military units, the lack of equipment to bring former infantry battalions of the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) up to United Nations size and standards, and the numerous logistical challenges associated with transporting equipment and supplies into the mission area.

29. The slow movement of contingent-owned equipment into the mission area is principally influenced by three factors: (a) the distance from Port Sudan to Darfur (over 2,000 km to Darfur's eastern border); (b) the capacity of local contractors to move the thousands of items of contingent-owned equipment overland from Port Sudan to the mission area; and (c) the limitations of the infrastructure in Darfur, in particular the poor quality of the roads and the capacity of the airports to accept incoming cargo aircraft.

30. As a result of related delays, the only deployment to be completed since the transfer of authority has been the Egyptian Signals Company, which deployed in May 2008. This company was able to deploy in a timely manner owing to its self-sustaining capabilities and the fact that it only required four containers of contingent-owned equipment to be brought into the mission area.

31. There has been some progress in the creation of the Nyala supercamp and the deployment of forces there. Sufficient contingent-owned equipment for the Chinese Engineer Company has now arrived at the Nyala supercamp for the advance party to build the main body's accommodation, and the main body is expected to arrive in July. Owing to delays in the transportation of contingent-owned equipment for the Egyptian Transport Company and the Bangladeshi Multi-Role Logistics Company, however, those units are not expected to arrive in Nyala until late August.

32. As of 15 June, a large portion of the contingent-owned equipment for the Egyptian Engineer Company had arrived in El Fasher, where the Company is due to deploy in July. Much of the equipment was damaged en route to El Fasher, however, and the deployment date of the company will depend upon the ability of the maintenance party to repair it quickly.

33. The final contingent-owned equipment for the Ethiopian Transport Company and the Ethiopian Multi-Role Logistics Company arrived in Port Sudan in late April; however, 72 per cent of the contingent-owned equipment is still in Port Sudan awaiting movement into the mission area.

34. Preparations to receive the first Egyptian Infantry Battalion in Um Kadada and the first Ethiopian Battalion in Kulbus are also behind schedule. The advance party of the Egyptian Battalion is expected to deploy by the end of July and that of the Ethiopian Battalion is expected to move forward in July. The Operation is also using all means possible to accelerate the movement of the Ethiopian contingent-owned equipment to Kulbus in order to permit the deployment of the main body before October 2008.

35. The contingent-owned equipment of the Nepalese and of the Indonesian formed police units has arrived at Port Sudan and the main bodies are expected to deploy by August provided the equipment is transported in time and the land required for the Indonesian formed police units is provided.

36. Since the signing of the status-of-forces agreement on 9 February 2008, the leadership of UNAMID has been meeting regularly with senior Government officials and continues to engage them on issues including freedom of movement across Darfur, security of convoy and supply routes, land acquisition for construction sites, airport operations, customs and issuance of visas. In the last meeting between the Government of the Sudan and UNAMID leadership, which took place on 16 June 2008, the Government gave its agreement to extend airport operating hours by an additional two hours, create a local technical committee that will address any technical problems, cooperate on security of convoys and supply routes and expedite customs clearances and issuance of visas. Sustained cooperation from the Government will continue to be integral to the success of deployment efforts.

37. A major support issue that will have a significantly negative impact on UNAMID deployment relates to the commercial contractor which is constructing accommodations and other critical infrastructure for the Operation. The contractor is far behind schedule and has not performed as expected. In order for it to meet its obligations and complete critical preparations for deployment, a major acceleration of its work will be required. Otherwise, there will be serious negative consequences for our deployment efforts, including a reduction in the Operation's capacity to absorb new military and police units, as well as civilian staff.

38. The Department of Field Support, in consultation with UNAMID, is developing a contingency plan to augment critical engineering capacity and address outstanding engineering requirements. Stopgap measures, including greater use of local and regional contractors and a greater reliance on engineering assets transferred from other missions are being examined. However, all options have inherent challenges and limitations, and will require time to put in place.

39. The force continues to lack a number of critical capabilities, including the majority of the military utility helicopters and a limited number of tactical helicopters to complement those offered by Ethiopia; a small fixed-wing air reconnaissance unit; a multi-role logistics company; and a transport company. The helicopters are critical to project the force to volatile areas and to provide protection to UNAMID personnel, humanitarian operators and the local population. It will also

allow the Operation to operate in areas where UNAMID does not maintain continuous ground presence. The fixed-wing reconnaissance aircraft are essential to provide UNAMID with a better situational awareness and early warning capacity. The necessity for these capabilities was underscored by the JEM attack on Omdurman, in which a number of vehicles travelled from Darfur to Omdurman undetected. The logistics company is needed to assist in building critical infrastructure for the force in the challenging environment of Darfur. The transport company will provide second line medium and heavy transport in support of the logistics detachment to the deployment sites throughout the region.

40. As part of the Secretariat's ongoing efforts to ensure the maximum possible deployment of UNAMID personnel, the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, Susana Malcorra, visited the Operation from 14 to 22 June. During her visit, she reviewed in detail the steps required for the Operation to accelerate movement of contingent-owned equipment and respond to engineering challenges.

41. In the meantime, the United Nations and the African Union continue to work together closely to address the range of challenges the two organizations are facing with regard to the deployment of the Operation. To this end, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Edmond Mulet, and Assistant Secretary-General for Field Support, Jane Holl Lute, travelled to Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, where they were joined by Joint Special Representative Rodolphe Adada for consultations with the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ramtane Lamamra, in the margins of the thirteenth Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of the African Union. These senior officials then met jointly with a team from the Government of the Sudan, who travelled to Sharm El Sheikh specifically for discussions with the African Union and the United Nations on the deployment of UNAMID.

42. During these discussions, the Sudanese representatives reiterated the Government's commitment to the deployment of UNAMID. The African Union-United Nations team emphasized the importance of Government cooperation and support in a few key areas: expeditious movement of contingent-owned equipment into Darfur (including the provision of security for convoys); the provision of land for camps; and the facilitation of engineering activities. Sudanese Government representatives also reported that UNAMID contingent-owned equipment convoys would be permitted to take place every 24 hours from El Obeid to Darfur. This is an increase from the previous Government provision for one convoy every 48 hours. The Government team also emphasized that instructions had been given to local officials regarding the importance of providing UNAMID with required sites.

43. The African Union and the United Nations will continue to conduct high-level consultations on Darfur on a regular basis to ensure continued coordination between the two organizations.

VI. Financial arrangements

44. The General Assembly, by its resolution 62/232 A, authorized the establishment of a special account for UNAMID and appropriated the amount of $1,275.7 million for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008, an equivalent of $106.3 million per month, for its establishment. In addition, by its resolution

62/232 B, the Assembly appropriated the amount of $1,499.7 million for the maintenance of UNAMID for the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009.

45. As of 31 May 2008, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNAMID amounted to approximately $345.1 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as of the same date amounted to $1,759.7 million.

46. Reimbursement of troop- and police-contributing Governments for troop and formed police unit costs has been made for the period up to 31 May 2008, including reimbursement of troop costs associated with contingent personnel deployed to the African Union Mission in the Sudan for the period from 1 October to 31 December 2007 in accordance with paragraph 5 (a) of Security Council resolution 1769 (2007).

VII. Political process

47. Despite the efforts of the two Special Envoys, the political process for Darfur appears to be at a standstill. The road map developed by the Special Envoys one year ago has reached an impasse, as the parties have not shown a genuine commitment to moving forward. After more than a year of strenuous efforts to bring the movements to a common position and to engage with the Government to identify additional concessions that might rejuvenate the peace process, the parties continue to resort to violence rather than a political solution to the conflict.

48. The prospect for immediate, all-inclusive and substantive peace talks has in fact decreased during the period of review, owing to the fragmentation of the movements (including the dissolution of the United Resistance Front (URF) into three separate groups), the deteriorating security situation, the absence of trust and cohesion between and within the parties, the renewed crisis between Chad and the Sudan exacerbated by the JEM attack on Omdurman and a general absence of political will to cease hostilities and resume negotiations.

49. The JEM attack on Omdurman represented a major development in the conflict in Darfur and for the Sudan as a whole. It demonstrated the continued inability of the parties to the conflict to settle their differences at the negotiating table rather than by force. I am particularly concerned by reports of child soldiers among the JEM combatants in Omdurman, in clear violation of international law. My office is pressing for the release of the children detained by the Government during the attack and I condemn the use of child soldiers in all instances.

50. In addition to exacerbating the tension between Chad and the Sudan, the JEM attack significantly hampered the political process in Darfur, not only because of the escalation of violence that ensued, but also as a result of the Government's resolve not to negotiate with JEM, which it now brands a terrorist organization.

51. Owing to the lack of meaningful progress in the political process, the Special Envoys decided on an incremental approach, outlined in the African Union-United Nations Framework for the Way Forward, which earmarked a cessation of hostilities as a preliminary step. This was in recognition of the fact that ongoing clashes and the deterioration of the security environment have serious negative implications for the humanitarian situation and the political process. The meeting with the regional and international partners, which was convened by the Special Envoys in Geneva on

17 and 18 March, also agreed that the amelioration of the security situation was of paramount priority.

52. The cessation of hostilities is an essential step to demonstrate goodwill and put in place the conditions for improved humanitarian activities. In order for the cessation of hostilities to occur, however, the parties must agree that the conflict in Darfur can only come to an end through a negotiated peace agreement.

53. I am encouraged by the agreement in June between SLA-Unity and the remaining elements of URF to unite their movements in July. Other reports of rapprochement between SLA-Unity and JEM could indicate that the movements might begin to coalesce if the right conditions are created.

54. The meeting in Geneva in March underscored the importance of sustained engagement with the people of Darfur through civil society, including women and youth. In this respect, the mediation team, through mechanisms established by UNAMID, has continued to harness the views of the civil society organizations, internally displaced persons and the leaders of the native administration. The selection process of civil society representatives has also intensified. The purpose remains not only to select representatives for indirect involvement in the talks, but also to engage the different constituencies on more substantive issues and prepare them to act as the political platform for the implementation of any subsequent peace agreements. The newly appointed Joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator, Djibril Bassolé, will take these initiatives forward as he conducts the mediation efforts in the Sudan on a full-time basis. Mr. Bassolé brings extensive experience in multilateral diplomacy and mediation to his new and challenging assignment.

VIII. Implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement

55. Implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement continues to be largely ignored by the parties on the ground and is further hindered by the refusal of non-signatories to recognize the mechanisms put in place by the Agreement. Violations of the ceasefire agreements occur frequently, by all parties to the conflict, and the Ceasefire Commission continues to be unable to investigate and monitor incidents on a formal basis, as the Joint Commission still has not met to agree to a new structure for the Ceasefire Commission.

56. The Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund, created at the Sirte talks in 2007, has begun its work to promote community-level peacebuilding in Darfur. In early June, the Fund Steering Committee, including representatives from the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue Commission, conducted a visit to Western Darfur, where they met with stakeholders in order to explain the Fund process and help identify projects for funding. Similar visits were conducted to Northern and Southern Darfur earlier in the year and the Fund recently approved funding for two peacebuilding and reconciliation projects in Darfur.

57. The Darfur-Darfur Dialogue Commission provided assistance to a four-day equestrian festival held in El Daien, Southern Darfur, from 30 May to 2 June. The festival brought together participants from a broad spectrum of Darfur tribes, including senior leaders from the Rizeigat, Fur, Fellata and Zaghawa tribes, who were joined by scholars, activists, editors and leading figures from the cultural

community across the Sudan. The festival provided a traditional platform for tribal leaders to meet UNAMID senior staff and to engage in dialogue, mediation and reconciliation.

IX. Implications of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Darfur

58. The Sudan's fifth population and housing census was carried out from 22 April to 6 May 2008. In Darfur, the census operation went ahead despite opposition of both non-signatories and signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement, a majority of internally displaced persons in SLA-Abdul Wahid camps and SLA-Minni Minawi. Government officials reported a success rate of 85 per cent in Western Darfur and 90 per cent in Northern and Southern Darfur. However, UNAMID was unable to verify this information. Internally displaced persons resisted enumeration in a number of camps and enumerators were unable to reach many areas throughout Darfur owing to prevailing insecurity. These areas were primarily on the border with Chad and in Southern Darfur, where rebel movements threatened enumerators and clashes between the Zaghawa and Birgid tribes occurred.

X. Observations and recommendations

59. I am deeply disappointed by the lack of progress that has been made towards resolving the Darfur conflict. The parties continue to pursue the path of military confrontation instead of dialogue, the deployment of UNAMID is far behind schedule, sexual and gender-based violence continues with impunity and heightened insecurity and banditry have severely hampered our ability to provide life-sustaining humanitarian assistance to nearly 2.5 million civilians in need.

60. The parties must come to the realization that violence will not achieve the objectives they seek in Darfur. Continued hostilities will only serve to prolong the suffering of innocent civilians, who have made clear time and again that they wish to return to their homes in a secure environment, knowing that their futures are protected by a credible and inclusive peace agreement.

61. Even as we take action to address the situation — by encouraging the parties to cease hostilities and come to the negotiating table, by deploying UNAMID and by providing humanitarian assistance on a massive scale — the situation in Darfur is becoming more entrenched. The parties continue to pursue military means and have not created the conditions necessary for the resumption of dialogue. Rampant banditry and hijackings throughout Darfur have significantly hindered the movement of humanitarian workers and vital relief items. As a result, the international community struggles to perform even the most basic work to protect civilians and bring them humanitarian assistance in this harsh and difficult environment.

62. Tensions between Chad and the Sudan and the suspension of diplomatic relations between the two countries should also be highlighted as a source of considerable instability in Darfur and volatility on both sides of the border region. The efforts of the Dakar Agreement contact group to lessen the tensions between the Sudan and Chad, as well as the important work of Jean Ping, Chairman of the

African Union Commission, to relaunch contact between the States, have been vital in promoting dialogue between the two States. The Contact Group last met on 9 June 2008 in Brazzaville and will meet again on 17 July 2008 in Dakar. Peace in Darfur is inextricably linked to peace and stability in the region and I count on all stakeholders to do their utmost to assist Chad and the Sudan in their implementation of the Dakar Agreement, as well as those agreements that preceded it.

63. We must also keep sight of the Darfur conflict in the context of the national framework. I am hopeful that the people of Darfur can eventually see their concerns expressed through an electoral process and that the means for finding a peaceful resolution of the conflict will be accelerated.

64. The newly appointed Chief Mediator will face the enormous challenge of having to take all of these complicating factors into consideration as he works to reinvigorate the peace process. His continuous presence in Darfur will play a critical role in helping the movements coalesce around political platforms, encouraging a cessation of hostilities and moving the process towards inclusive negotiations. However, his appointment will not be sufficient; his success will hinge to a large extent on the will of the parties to resolve their differences through dialogue and, no less significantly, the full and unconditional support of the international community.

65. I would like to express my deep appreciation for the efforts of Special Envoys Jan Eliasson and Salim Ahmed Salim, who have worked to reinvigorate the peace process and bring the parties back to the negotiating table. The Special Envoys for Darfur will remain available for advice and engagement with the political process, as required.

66. In the meantime, it is critical that we press forward to maximize deployment of UNAMID throughout the remainder of this year. As we do so, there will necessarily be a period in which the majority of the Operation's resources will be focused on creating the conditions required for deployment. This means that, during this initial period, UNAMID will not be in a position to fully implement its mandate or make a robust contribution to solidifying peace in Darfur. Nevertheless, UNAMID will continue to use the resources at its disposal to provide protection for civilians who continue to be affected by the ongoing conflict.

67. In conclusion, I would like to express my appreciation to all United Nations personnel and humanitarian actors working in Darfur. I also wish to thank Member States, including donor and troop-contributing countries, for their continued support for the deployment of UNAMID and for their efforts to encourage the parties to cease hostilities and return to the path of dialogue.

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1778 (2007), by which the Council requested me to report to it every three months on the security and humanitarian situation in eastern Chad, the north-eastern Central African Republic and the region, including movements of refugees and internally displaced persons and progress made in creating security conditions conducive to their voluntary return. The report covers major developments since my report of 1 April 2008 (S/2008/215), including the deployment of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), the European Union-led military force (EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic) and the Détachement intégré de sécurité (DIS).

II. Update on recent developments

A. Political developments

2. The efforts to promote dialogue between the Government and opposition groups yielded mixed results during the reporting period. While the dialogue between the Government and the political parties has been revived within the framework of the 13 August 2007 agreement, no progress has been made towards the opening of similar dialogue with the Chadian Armed Opposition Group (CAOG). Although CAOG has been calling for dialogue, it continues to pursue the military option as indicated in section B below. At a meeting held on 25 March with majority leaders of the political parties, President Idriss Deby Itno reiterated his commitment to the full implementation of the 13 August 2007 agreement on the reinforcement of the democratic process in Chad. In a communiqué issued on the same day, the President reaffirmed his commitment to dialogue with political parties and civil society and called for opposition parties to resume their participation in the Monitoring and Support Committee established to facilitate the implementation of the 13 August 2007 agreement. President Deby also requested the National Commission of Inquiry, established on 2 April to look into the events of early February 2008, to begin work immediately.

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3. On 28 March, however, members of the opposition coalition, the Coordination des partis politiques pour la défense de la Constitution (CPDC), issued a statement expressing doubts about the President's intention to initiate an inclusive political dialogue. CPDC also called for the immediate "release" of its spokesperson, and leader of the Parti pour les libertés et le développement, Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh, whose whereabouts remain unknown.

4. The Rassemblement des forces pour le changement (RFC), headed by Timane Erdimi, reportedly split into two groups during the reporting period. One faction has entered into negotiations with the Government, while the other joined the Alliance Nationale, a new coalition of Chadian armed opposition groups led by the leader of the Union des forces pour la démocratie et le développement, Mahamat Nouri. On 25 March, a small group of armed elements from RFC travelled to N'Djamena and surrendered their weapons to the Government, while the Union des forces pour le changement et la démocratie announced its integration into the armed Alliance Nationale. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya announced the opening of inter-Chadian peace negotiations in Tripoli on 14 April between the Government of Chad and RFC.

5. On 15 April, President Deby appointed as Prime Minister Youssouf Saleh Abbas, who until then had been the President's Special Representative for MINURCAT and EUFOR and head of the Coordination nationale d'appui à la force internationale (CONAFIT). President Deby subsequently signed a presidential decree designating the new Government, including four former political opponents appointed as the Ministers of Justice, Defence, Agriculture and Territorial Administration. These positive steps towards a broad-based Government enjoyed considerable national support.

6. In his first speech before the National Assembly on 6 May, Prime Minister Saleh Abbas outlined his Government's programme, including the implementation of the 13 August 2007 agreement. He also announced that Government emissaries had entered into direct negotiations with Chadian armed opposition groups to bring those groups back into the framework of the peace agreement signed on 25 October 2007 in Sirte, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, between the Government and the main Chadian armed opposition groups. It will be recalled that under the Sirte accord, the Government and the armed opposition groups undertook to respect the Constitution, cease fighting, grant amnesty to the rebels, allow rebel groups to participate in the running of State affairs and integrate rebel forces into the Chadian national army.

7. On 10 April, President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, in consultation with the leader of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Muammar Al-Qadhafi and the President of Gabon, Omar Bongo, convened in Libreville the first meeting of the contact group established to monitor the implementation of the Dakar accord between Chad and the Sudan. Members of the contact group, including the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Congo, Senegal, Gabon, Eritrea, Chad, the Sudan, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, the Economic Community of Central African States and the African Union met at the ministerial level to consider the possibility of deploying observers and organizing joint patrols to monitor the border between Chad and the Sudan. Participants also urged Presidents Deby of Chad and Al-Bashir of the Sudan to peacefully settle tensions between their countries. The contact group decided to meet on a monthly basis to ensure follow-up to the implementation of the Dakar accord.

8. Within the context of ongoing regional political initiatives, and at the invitation of the Minister for African Affairs of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Ali Triki, my Special Representative for the Central African Republic and Chad travelled to Tripoli on 23 and 24 April, to brief Libyan authorities on the MINURCAT mandate and to gain a better understanding of Tripoli's views on the implementation of the Dakar accord.

9. In the north-eastern part of the Central African Republic, the situation continues to be calm. Despite recent power struggles within the political leadership of the Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement (UFDR), the movement continues to respect the ceasefire provisions of the April 2007 Birao peace agreement. A comprehensive peace agreement, including provisions for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of Central African Republic rebel groups, was signed between the Government and UFDR and the Popular Army for the Restoration of Democracy on 21 June in Libreville. The Democratic Front of the Central African People, which participated in the preliminary meetings, did not sign the agreement because its leader, Abdoulaye Miskine, did not authorize the negotiators to do so on behalf of the movement. This agreement will be an integral part of the upcoming inclusive political dialogue, a reconciliatory process aimed at addressing the country's political and security crises. An international committee comprised of other central African States and the European Union will monitor the agreement.

B. Security situation

10. The security situation in the border areas of Chad and the Central African Republic with Darfur remains fragile and unpredictable. The relations between Chad and the Sudan showed no concrete signs of improvement, despite the signing of the 13 March Dakar accord. On 14 March, one day after signing the accord, the Government of Chad told MINURCAT that several columns of heavily armed rebels had crossed from the Sudan into Chadian territory at Moudeina, 60 kilometres south-east of Adé. On the same day, some 25 to 45 vehicles with armed rebels were seen by United Nations personnel in Choukouyane, about 140 kilometres south-east of Abéché. The Chadian National Armed Forces (FANT) subsequently redeployed near Adré, located 150 kilometres south-east of Abéché. On 1 April, FANT engaged rebels affiliated with the Alliance Nationale in a four-hour battle near Adé, located at the border with the Sudan some 160 kilometres south-east of Abéché. The rebels were repelled and reportedly withdrew towards the Sudanese border.

11. On 27 March, the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/2008/212), alleging that Chad had violated the Dakar accord and previous agreements by sponsoring a meeting of Darfur rebel groups on 22 and 24 March in the Abu Nabaq area, with the participation of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). On 1 April, the Permanent Representative of Chad addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/2008/222), alleging that Chad had been attacked by Sudanese-backed armed groups in Adé, in violation of the 13 March Dakar accord.

12. On 1 April, I issued a statement expressing concern over the continued movements of rebel groups across the Chad-Sudan border and calling upon the Governments of Chad and the Sudan to uphold their commitments under the

13 March Dakar accord and to make every effort to ensure that rebel groups do not use their territory as a staging ground for incursions.

13. The attacks by JEM rebels against Khartoum on 10 May further worsened the already tense relations between Chad and the Sudan. The momentum generated by the signing of the Dakar agreement faded as the Sudan accused Chad of masterminding the attacks, and the Sudan severed diplomatic ties with N'Djamena. On 11 May, the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/2008/325) accusing Chad of having planned, financed and carried out the 10 May events. Chad denied any involvement.

14. On 12 May, members of the contact group, except the Sudan, met in Tripoli for its second ministerial meeting. The contact group condemned the 10 May attack against the Government of the Sudan and expressed solidarity with the people of that country. In an effort to prevent any escalation between Chad and the Sudan, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Jean Ping, visited N'Djamena and Khartoum to help defuse the tensions and facilitate the restoration of normal ties between the two countries. On 9 June, the third ministerial meeting of the contact group was held in Brazzaville, Congo with the participation of the representatives of Chad and the Sudan. The meeting reaffirmed the contact group's determination to help both countries restore relations through confidence-building, peace, friendship and "brotherliness".

15. On 11 June, following reports that Chadian rebel groups had crossed the border in Moudeina, FANT bombed suspected rebel groups. Fighting erupted between FANT and Chadian rebel groups around the Koukou Angarana and Goz Amer refugee camps on 12 June. The following day, Chadian rebel groups took control of Goz Beida before withdrawing to the outskirts of Abéché several hours later. During the brief occupation of Goz Beida, the rebel groups looted offices of aid agencies, including the premises of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and set ablaze a fuel depot. Aid workers sought refuge in the EUFOR camp during the attack. On 15 June, Chadian rebel groups took control of Am Dam, some 120 kilometres south of Abéché. The column subsequently withdrew some 40 kilometres south of Abéché. On 16 June, a third column of rebel groups took the town of Biltine, 90 kilometres north of Abéché. Although the rebel groups had announced that their ultimate objective was to attack N'Djamena, they started retreating eastwards towards the Chad-Sudan border on 17 June. The groups attacked several towns including Biltine and Am Zoer during the retreat. On 17 June, the Government of Chad reported that Sudanese army helicopters had attacked the town of Adé, a charge which was denied by the Government of the Sudan.

16. On 2 April, in the north-western Central African Republic, the Multinational Force of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community inaugurated a new military base. Together with the expected arrival of a 120-strong Cameroonian contingent, this should improve the security situation in the area and allow State authorities to extend their presence in this volatile region.

C. Humanitarian situation

17. The 180,000 internally displaced persons and 250,000 refugees in eastern Chad continue to be gravely affected by ongoing internal and cross-border hostilities. The civilian character of refugee camps and internally displaced persons sites continues to be compromised by the presence of armed elements in and around the camps. During the reporting period, some 6,000 newly arrived refugees from Darfur were relocated from the border areas to the Kounoungo and Mile refugee camps some 200 kilometres north-east of Abéché.

18. The fragile security climate continues to impede humanitarian operations and access. On 1 May, a three-car convoy, including United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, was stopped by two armed elements on the road from Farchana to Adré. The Director of Save the Children (United Kingdom) was asked to leave the car and to lie on the ground. He was later shot and killed. On 10 May, two gendarmes from the Commission Nationale d'Aide aux Réfugiés (CNAR), working with UNHCR, prevented a car belonging to a non-governmental organization from being hijacked. The following day, the two gendarmes were killed in Am Nabak. Chadian gendarmes under the CNAR and UNHCR arrangement continue to provide security for the refugees and internally displaced persons pending the deployment of DIS in eastern Chad. On 27 May, following the hijacking of humanitarian vehicles at gunpoint, Médecins Sans Frontières — Luxembourg, based in Iriba, decided to leave the country, leaving some 50,000 Sudanese refugees in Am Nabak, Touloum and Iridimi camps with reduced health-care services.

19. Although the conditions for the return of refugees to Darfur and the Central African Republic are yet to be created, small spontaneous return movements are being observed among internally displaced persons. Humanitarian agencies are starting to plan for the potential voluntary return of internally displaced persons to certain locations, especially around the Goz Beida area, once their security, basic needs and reconciliation can be addressed. On 17 May, the voluntary return of internally displaced persons was discussed at the first meeting of CONAFIT with EUFOR, MINURCAT, and the diplomatic and humanitarian communities. It was decided that there would be no return as long as all the necessary conditions were not in place.

20. A mid-year consolidated appeal review workshop was held in N'Djamena on 19 and 20 May. Of the $288 million needed, only 21 per cent has been funded to date. There is increasing concern that insufficient funding for humanitarian activities in Chad will have significant consequences for the vulnerable populations, including refugees, the displaced and host communities, who need assistance for their survival.

21. During her visit to Chad and the Central African Republic, from 25 to 31 May, my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy, highlighted the plight of refugee and internally displaced children and urged all parties to prevent any further illegal recruitment of children into armed groups. She encouraged both Governments to address the issues of child trafficking and sexual violence against girls. As a result, the Chadian authorities have agreed to release over 60 children held in detention and to allow verification visits to military camps and military training institutes to prevent any further recruitment of minors.

III. Activities of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad

22. As of 15 June, the strength of MINURCAT stood at 592, including 148 United Nations police officers and 26 military liaison officers. The Deputy Special Representative, Rima Salah, took up her duties in Chad on 9 May 2008. The Mission is currently deployed in N'Djamena, Abéché, Goz Beida, Facharna, Bangui and Birao.

A. Police

23. During the period under review, MINURCAT established a coordination mechanism with CONAFIT to develop a close strategic and operational relationship with the Détachement intégré de sécurité (DIS). The DPKO standing police capacity continues to provide the start-up capacity for the police component of MINURCAT.

24. To date, over 211 out of 300 authorized United Nations police officers have been recruited, of whom 175 have already been deployed to Chad, including five to Abéché, five to Bangui and one to Birao. The deployment of the remaining police officers has been delayed due to the Mission's limited capacity to accommodate personnel. It is envisaged that United Nations police will deploy to Farchana in July, Goz Beida in August-September and Guereda, Iriba and Bahai in October 2008.

25. In the Central African Republic, MINURCAT continued to work closely with the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (BONUCA) and the United Nations country team to support police sector reform activities and the restoration of State authority in the Vakaga region in the north-eastern part of the country. From 14 to 17 April, MINURCAT undertook a joint mission with the Government of the Central African Republic to Birao to assess the situation and develop a common response to the security challenges. Five United Nations police officers have deployed to Bangui where they are co-located with BONUCA, and one United Nations police officer joined the two military liaison officers already present in Birao, north-eastern Central African Republic, to assess the needs of the local police and provide them with initial support.

26. As mentioned in my previous report (S/2008/215), MINURCAT successfully completed the training of DIS trainers in January 2008. On 24 May, 77 selected DIS commanders completed their one-month training. Candidates for 220 DIS officer posts will be selected from the gendarmerie and national police by the end of June and trained immediately thereafter with a view to deploying DIS officers in eastern Chad by the end of July.

27. A number of challenges affect the full deployment of United Nations police and DIS officers, the greatest being the absence of infrastructure for office and living space, inadequate logistical support for the training facilities and delays in refurbishing of the National Police Academy. Limited ground and air transportation also represent a challenge in the face of the upcoming rainy season. Other issues have been the absence of a legal framework establishing DIS, which is linked to the delay in signing the memorandum of understanding between the Government of Chad and MINURCAT on DIS, and the delay in selecting the first batch of 220 police officers and gendarmes that will integrate with DIS.

B. Military liaison officers

28. During the period under review, MINURCAT deployed a total of 24 military liaison officers. While one officer is embedded in the EUFOR operational headquarters in Mont Valérien, France, six are based in Abéché, two in Farchana and two in Goz Beida. In the Central African Republic, one military liaison officer is deployed in Bangui and two in Birao. Additionally, 10 officers are based in N'Djamena, including those assigned to the joint operation centre and the joint military analysis cell.

29. MINURCAT military liaison officers and EUFOR are working together to strengthen their partnership and framework for cooperation. This includes intensified consultations and coordination on a regular basis as well as the sharing of information on security-related matters.

C. Rule of law

30. From 15 to 23 April, an inter-agency planning mission led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations visited Chad to assess the justice and corrections system in Chad as related to the mandated activities of MINURCAT. The mission included representatives of UNHCR, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the European Commission.

31. The team met with national authorities, civil society and international partners and visited justice and prison facilities in N'Djamena, Abéché and Goz Beida. Eastern Chad is marked by barely functioning justice institutions, with a lack of judges and prosecutors and serious gaps in court infrastructure. In addition, the team noted an almost complete absence of defence lawyers working in the east. While UNHCR currently supports a small Chadian mobile court operation providing some judicial coverage outside of Abéché, this coverage is minimal.

32. With respect to the prison system, there is no functioning prison in Goz Beida, and there are serious infrastructure and other constraints affecting the Abéché prison, including poor prison security. In addition, there is no dedicated cadre of prison officials and no female officers to guard female inmates. With the limited number of functioning prisons in the east, an unknown number of individuals are held in small detention cells run by police and military personnel.

33. With regard to arrests and detention-related activities of DIS, the team outlined a three-pronged approach including tracking of the cases of those detained or arrested by DIS, support for Chad's mobile court system and support to key prisons. In addition to technical assistance, this approach will require significant funding through the MINURCAT trust fund. As recommended, MINURCAT will coordinate relations between the United Nations and donors in the justice and corrections sectors in eastern Chad. Partners, including UNDP, OHCHR and UNHCR, have agreed to pursue a common, coherent strategy for assistance in this sector, based upon the findings of the planning team.

34. In May 2008, following the planning mission, MINURCAT undertook three joint assessment exercises with the Chadian prison authorities to consider cost-

effective ways to improve the prison infrastructure and the general prison conditions in some areas. A joint prison development committee, including national prison authorities and representatives of MINURCAT, UNDP and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), was subsequently established to address the overall needs of the prison system. Issues already discussed include the recruitment and training of 200 Chadians as a foundation for the establishment of a professional prison system. MINURCAT has developed four quick-impact projects to address needs in terms of general infrastructure, security, improved accommodation, sanitary facilities and health service delivery in the Abéché, Goz Beida and N'Djamena prisons.

D. Human rights

35. During the reporting period, human rights officers documented reports of armed attacks on civilians by men in civilian and military clothes in eastern Chad. In most cases, the perpetrators were not identified and therefore have not been brought to justice. Human rights officers also received reports of sexual and gender-based violence and other forms of violence against women, including rape, in and outside refugee camps and displaced persons sites and in several villages. Corroborated information from various sources, including United Nations agencies and civil society organizations, also confirmed that at least four girls, including one minor, were raped by nine FANT soldiers as they were on their way to Were village situated 20 kilometres east of Abéché. The victims' parents subsequently lodged a complaint which led the police to arrest the alleged perpetrators.

36. On 3 June, MINURCAT met with the Minister of Human Rights, Fatime Issa Ramadane, together with senior officials of the Ministry. The meeting focused on the main challenges in eastern Chad and how MINURCAT and the Ministry could work together to address them.

E. Gender

37. During the period under review, MINURCAT strengthened its collaboration with the Ministry of Social Affairs and the prison authorities. In collaboration with Chadian women's organizations and the Ministry of Social Affairs, MINURCAT has been able to advocate for the improvement of prison conditions for female inmates and support projects assisting the effective reintegration of females and juveniles into society.

38. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), MINURCAT has undertaken to promote gender mainstreaming in its activities, especially in the context of policing. Comprehensive training materials have been developed to help staff respond effectively to, investigate and prevent incidents of gender-based violence, especially in settings involving refugees and internally displaced persons. MINURCAT also developed a gender policy and strategy paper for the guidance of DIS and a set of policy and action guidelines to mainstream the intertwined strands of gender and community policing in recruitment, deployment, promotion, conduct and discipline and other human resources and operational aspects of DIS.

39. Bearing in mind the specificities of women and children, MINURCAT developed training modules on child rights and child militarization as well as a child

victim-witness protocol with a view to sensitizing United Nations police and DIS personnel on the specific conditions and needs of children in refugee camps and communities of internally displaced persons.

F. Support

40. MINURCAT has developed a three-phase plan to ensure timely deployment and respect for security conditions in the east. The strategy is to maximize the usage of logistics materials deployed from the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi, locally available resources and support available from EUFOR in order to deploy up to one third of the mission in eastern Chad, under extremely austere conditions, until new contracts for camp construction, logistics and management can be completed.

41. Phase 1 of the plan, which began on 1 April, involves the deployment of 110 personnel in existing structures in Abéché and tents within the EUFOR camps. This phase will be implemented in each location. Phase 2 involves the deployment of up to 250 staff in prefabricated buildings constructed by MINURCAT personnel in each location. It began in Abéché on 15 June and is due to be completed by 1 September in Iriba. This phase will also see the initial deployment of DIS officers to police facilities consisting of containerized offices and tents. Phase 3 involves the deployment of all remaining staff to eastern Chad and is predicated on the signing of a commercial camp construction contract by 1 July 2008, which would allow the deployment to be completed by 1 November 2008.

G. Staff safety and security

42. During the reporting period, as a result of an improvement in the security situation in Chad, the security phase in the capital and southern areas of the country was reduced from phase IV to phase III. In effect, this change applies to N'Djamena, Chari-Barguimi (Massenya), Guera (Mongo), Salamat (Am Timam), Logone Occidental (Moundou), Logone Oriental (Doba), Mandoul (Koumra), Mayo-Kebbi Est (Bongor), Mayo-Kebi Est (Pala), and Tandjile (Laï).

43. While the scaling down of the security phase is appropriate in the areas described above, the security phase in eastern Chad is recommended to remain at phase IV owing to the continued volatility in that part of the country.

IV. Deployment of the European Union-led military force

44. As of 19 June, EUFOR personnel deployed in Chad and the Central African Republic numbered 3,000, including some 200 in Birao, north-eastern Central African Republic. In addition, EUFOR has 200 personnel in its operational headquarters at Mont Valérien near Paris. EUFOR continues its deployment according to schedule. When fully deployed, the force will consist of some 3,700 troops.

45. EUFOR has established its military bases in Abéché, Goz Beida, Farchana, Iriba and Birao, where it provides MINURCAT with security, protection and limited logistics support, except for Iriba where MINURCAT has not yet deployed. In N'Djamena, the EUFOR rear force headquarters is also ready to support

MINURCAT with limited office accommodation until MINURCAT deploys its own infrastructure in the space provided.

46. From 7 to 11 April, Lieutenant General Patrick Nash, the EUFOR Operation Commander, visited Chad and the Central African Republic to monitor progress in the implementation of the force's mandate and meet with key partners in theatre. From 6 to 7 May, the European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, visited the Central African Republic and Chad where he met with both President Bozizé and President Deby. The delegation also met with my Special Representatives, EUFOR and relevant actors working in Chad and the Central African Republic.

V. Financial implications

47. The General Assembly, by its resolution 62/233 of 22 December 2007, appropriated $182.4 million for MINURCAT for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008. As at 30 April 2008, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for MINURCAT amounted to $45.0 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $2,303.8 million.

VI. Observations

48. I am deeply concerned by the repeated cycles of rebel incursions into Chad and the continuing insecurity in the country. The fragile security climate has impeded humanitarian access, particularly since the killing of the Director of Save the Children on 1 May. I reiterate my condemnation of this criminal act and urge all parties to grant unrestricted access to humanitarian workers in eastern Chad.

49. Only a real political dialogue between the Government of Chad and the armed and non-armed opposition groups, as well as a mending of the relationship between Khartoum and N'Djamena can provide a lasting solution to the conflict in Chad. Once again, I urge the Governments of Chad and the Sudan to fully implement the 13 March Dakar agreement and take steps towards the normalization of their relations. The United Nations stands ready to work together with the African Union and other partners in supporting efforts to restore lasting peace and security along the Chad-Sudan border.

50. I am pleased with the level of cooperation extended by the Government of Chad to MINURCAT and EUFOR. However, it is important for the Government to expedite finalization of the legal framework for the deployment of the Détachement intégré de sécurité (DIS).

51. With the training of DIS trainees and commanders, MINURCAT has made a good start on its main task of enhancing the capacity of DIS to maintain law and order in the refugee camps and internally displaced persons locations. The Mission, the Government and EUFOR should now redouble their efforts to overcome the delays encountered in the next phase of the training of the DIS main body. In this regard, MINURCAT will explore the possibility of increasing the size of DIS classes and expediting the deployment of the United Nations police personnel. While the Government should accelerate submission of potential candidates, EUFOR could

consider greater flexibility in the accommodation space provided for MINURCAT personnel and in security arrangements for MINURCAT facilities.

52. EUFOR and MINURCAT are not in a position to directly address the problem of cross-border movement by armed groups. Furthermore, the mandates of MINURCAT and EUFOR limit the role of the two missions to addressing only the consequences and not the issues underlying the conflict in Chad. Unless these fundamental issues are addressed, and in the absence of a viable dialogue between the Government and all opposition groups, the resources invested by the international community in Chad risk being wasted. My report to the Security Council in September 2008 will examine these issues and provide recommendations on post-EUFOR arrangements.

53. Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, Victor Angelo, and the entire staff of MINURCAT, EUFOR, the United Nations country team and the humanitarian community for the commendable work they are doing in Chad and the Central African Republic.